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CAN ADMINISTRATION HANDLING OF LABOR
PROBLEMS BRING INDUSTRIAL PEACE?

By E. KONTZ

BENNETT*

The American bar has frequently criticized the everincreasing use of administrative agencies to handle legal
problems.' On the other hand, the bar itself has frequently
been criticized by the lay public for its failure to expand
legal machinery and legal concepts so as to meet a rapidly
changing world. The bar, known for its ability to appraise
honestly its own shortcomings, has often posed this question: "Would the administrative agencies be so frequently
and consistently set up by law-making bodies if they did
not supply a real need?"
I
The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,' gen-

erally known to the profession and to the lay public as
the Taft-Hartley Act, represents legislative effort to com*Member of the Georgia Bar, Waycross, Ga.
1. Pound, Annual Survey of Law: Decisions of Courts Show Some
Dangerous Trends, 33 A.B.A.J. 1093, 1094 (1947). This legal
scholar voices his fear in the following language: "Even more
significant is the marked perponderance of public and administrative law-of determination by administrative agencies and
officials, affecting everyday rights of individuals over the law
applied by the Courts governing private relations. The Survey
as a whole suggests Jennings' proposition that in the Englishspeaking world, public law is swallowing up private law...
But there are currents and counter-currents in the course of decision on matters of public law. On the one hand, there is a steady
extension of the powers of the Federal Government. On the other
hand, there is a steady giving up of or refusal to exercise the
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts as permitted by the Constitution. In connection with the tendency to concede the widest power
and freedom from judicial scrutiny to administrative agencies,
this suggests a change in our policy in the direction of centralized
absolutism."
2. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (Supp. 1948). For
convenience this statute is sometimes referred to as the TaftHartle'y Act in this article.
(244)
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bine both administrative and legal handling of the many
serious labor problems confronting the nation today. The
National Labor Relations Board, originally set up under
the Wagner Act, and continued under the Taft-Hartley
Act, exercises jurisdiction over industries engaged in interstate commerce through twenty-one regional directors who
cover all the forty-eight states and the territories. Elaborate machinery is set up to assist the Board, including the
office of the General Counsel, which investigates charges of
unfair labor practices either by an employer or by a union,
prosecutes unfair labor practices where complaints are
filed, and takes steps to enforce or review orders of the
NLRB by filing petitions in the United States Court of
Appeals. Trial examiners preside at original hearings on
petitions for the certification of a bargaining representative
and at the trials of complaints based on unfair labor practices. At the conclusion of a hearing or trial, the examiner
issues what is called a recommended order and, if no exceptions are filed with the Board within 2o days, this becomes
the order of the Board. There can be no question but that
Congress intended to ma"ke the procedures of the trial examiners as nearly as possible like the ordinary trial in a federal
court, and Congress certainly intended to sever any personal relationship between the NLRB and the examiners
so far as cases which are heard by the trial examiner are
concerned. Section 4(a)" of the act provides as follows:
3.

61 STAT. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 154 (Supp. 1948). These provisions
of Section 4(a) were explained by the Senate Committee, S. REP.
No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., as follows:

"One of the major criticisms of the Board's performance of its
judicial duties has been that the members themselves, except on
the most important cases, have fallen into the habit of delegating
the reviewing of the transcripts of the hearings and findings of
trial examiners to a unit of the general counsel's office called the
Review Section. This means that after exceptions are filed and
oral argument is scheduled, the Board members rely for their
knowledge of the cases upon a memorandum submitted by one of
the review attorneys. The memorandum sent to each member is
identical and has been already reviewed and revised by the super-

visory employees of this Section, even though they have not seen
the transcripts or familiarized themselves with the briefs and bills
of exception. Unless the final memorandum, therefore, differs from
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It**No
trial examiner's report shall be reviewed, either before or after its publication, by any person other than a member
of the Board or his legal assistant, and no trial examiner shall
advise or consult with the Board with respect to exceptions taken
to his findings, rulings, or recommendations."

It is thus to be noted that trial examiners under the TaftHartley law take on the functions of trial judges. Their
rulings become the law of the case insofar as the NLRB is
concerned, unless exceptions are filed, in which event the
NLRB becomes the first court of appeal. If exceptions are
filed, either party may appear before the Board and argue
the trial examiner's report in major respects, the attention of the
Board members may not be focused upon the sharpest issues in
the case.
"After the Board has voted, it has also been the practice to
assign to the Review Section the duty of preparing a draft opinion. Consequently, unless there is a dissent which one of the majority members sees fit to answer, both the decision and the form
in which it appears are virtuall'y a product of the corporate personality of this legal section. In other words, the Board, instead
of acting like an appellate court where the divergent views of the
different justices may be reflected in each decision, tends to dispose of cases in an institutional fashion. To that extent, the congressional purpose in having the act administered by a Board of
several members rather than a single administrator has been
frustrated.
"Since it is the belief of the committee that Congress intended
the Board to function like a court, this bill eliminates the Review
Section. In its place each Board member may have as many legal
assistants of his own as is necessary to review transcripts and
assist him in the drafting of the opinions on cases to which he
is assigned. Since the Board's function is largely a judicial one,
conformance with the practices of appellate courts in this respect
should make for decisions which will truly represent the considered opinions of the Board members.
"A corollary to this reform relates to the Trial Examining
Division. Tremendous responsibility rests upon the judgment of
the individual trial examiner who is sent by the Board to the
field to hear contested cases, appraise the credibility of the witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, make findings of fact and
recommendations for Board decision. Under current practice, before a trial examiner issues his report to the parties, its contents
are reviewed and frequentl'y changed or influenced by the supervisory employees in the Trial Examining Division. Yet, since the
report is signed only by the trial examiner, the Board holds him
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the case. When the Board finally issues its order, either dissatisfied party may then have the order reviewed by the
United States Court of Appeals, the functions of this court
being as follows:
i. Determination of whether the Board has conducted a fair
hearing.
2. Consideration of whether the Board's findings of facts are
supported by substantial evidence.
3. Determination o whether the Board's conclusions of law
are based on a preponderance of the evidence.
4. Determination of whether the Board's order is reasonably
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.

The United States Court of Appeals has wide jurisdiction,
and a decree may be entered enforcing, modifying or setting
aside in whole or in part the former order of the Board;
out as the sole person who has made a judgment on the evidence
developed at the hearing. In the first Morgan case, (Morgan v.
United States, 298 U.S. 268, 480-481), one of the leading decisions
on administrative law, the Supreme Court enunciated the following principle:
'If the one who determines the facts which underlie the
order has not considered evidence and argument, it is manifest that the hearing has not been given. .

.

. The one who

.

.

decides must hear.
'This necessary rule does not preclude
aid of assistants. . ...

.

obtaining the

"It would be difficult to think of a practice which does greater
violence to this principle. Consequently, the committee bill prohibits any of the staff from influencing or reviewing the trial
examiner's report in advance of publication, thereby obviating the
need for reviewing personnel in the Trial Examining Division.
"Another questionable practice which the committee has considered has been the attendance of trial examiners at executive
sessions of the Board when cases are being decided. Under its
rules, the Board gives the parties adversely affected by the trial
examiner's report an opportunity to appear by counsel before the
Board to argue exceptions. The rules also permit opposing counsel to appear to defend findings in a trial examiner's report which
represent his position in the case. It is therefore unfair to the
parties to permit a trial examiner, after his findings have alternately been assailed and defended at public hearing, to make a
final defense of his published determination behind the scenes.
It would seem unnecessary to legislate in this matter at all (since
the Board has it in its own power to correct these practices) if
it were not for the fact that even the present Board has persisted
in adhering to such unjudicial practices."
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or, if additional evidence is thought to be material, the
Court may remand the case to the Board for the hearing of
further testimony and the making of new findings of fact.
Failure to obey the order of the United States Court of
Appeals results in contempt proceedings. From the Court
of Appeals the case can be taken by either dissatisfied party
to the Supreme Court of the United States.
From this brief outline of the essential working features
of the machinery of the Taft-Hartley law, it will be seen that
much of the legal machinery as known to the bar in federal
court procedure is embodied in the Act. With one exception, the procedure is not unlike an ordinary civil suit in a
federal district court involving a complicated issue of accounting which is referred to a special master, who takes
evidence and reports his findings to the federal judge. Dissatisfaction by either party with the order or judgment of a
federal district court results in an appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court of
the United States. The exception referred to is that the
NLRB is, in effect, substituted for the federal district judge.
In substance, Congress has said' that the NLRB shall conduct elections for bargaining representatives and shall
adjudicate charges of unfair labor practice preferred by
either an employer or a union, that the whole field of employer-employee relations as it is developing today is so
large that it is necessary to have a special administrative
board to handle the problem; and that the NLRB shall, in
4.

See 61 STAT. 136 et seq. (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. 1948),
findings and declaration of poli2y; 29 U.S.C. § 153, National Labor
Relations Board; 29 U.S.C. § 157: "The Board shall have authority frcm time to time to make, amend and rescind . . . such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter."

5. See Gwynne, Administrative Procedure Act: A Warning Against
its Impairment by Legislation, 34 A.B.A.J. 8,9 (1948) : "Nevertheless, it must be recognized that many of these agencies cannot be
eliminated. They came into existence to render services that purely
legislative and judicial bodies could not render. The development
of commerce in England created problems that the common law
Courts of the day seemed unable to handle. And so there grew
up the law merchant-administered in separate informal tri-
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addition to the administrative problems involved in representation and in unfair labor practices, strive for industrial
peace at all stages and levels of the conflict. The TaftHartley Act also provides for a Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service,' a National Labor-Management Panel,7
a continuing Joint Congressional Committee on Basic
Labor Problems,8 and special Boards of Inquiry for National Emergencies.'
It cannot be denied that industrial peace is one of the
major domestic problems of our time. The struggle for
balance between employee rights and employer prerogatives is in an unstable and rapidly developing stage.' The
bar, the lay public, the employer and the employee can well
ask themselves just how the conflicting interests can be
reconciled, the rights of the contending parties fairly adjudicated, the labor unrest eliminated, and industrial peace
eventually achieved. It is to be recognized frankly that no
court, no administrative body, nor any presently enacted
law is going to be satisfactory to employer and employee interests for many years to come, and that a process of trial
and error is inevitable.
11

Would the Taft-Hartley act be improved if the NLRB
coninued its administrative duties but yielded its function
of judicial interpretation of the Act and allowed the federal district courts to adopt, modify, or reject the trial

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

bunals. E-uitv law had a somewhat similar history. It is to the
credit cf the judg :s and lawyers of that day that they were able
to reco -nize the need of these new principles of jurisprudence,
and e-entually to bring them within the orbit of the common law
as then being administered. Thus the needs of a progressinr, civilization were met; the law was enriched; and the fundamental principlcs of du2 prccess were retained and developed."
Taft-aInrtl y Act, 61 SWAT. 136 Ct seq. (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 172
(Supp. 1948).
29 U.S.C. § 175.
29 U.S.C. § 191.
29 U.S.C. § 176.
See The Developing Law: Management Prerogatives and Collcctiic Bargaining, 1 CCH LAB. LAW. JOURN. 3 (1949).
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examiner's reports in the first instance-or, if not federal
courts at the trial level, then perhaps, labor courts with
judges of equal qualifications?
A brief history of important labor statutes preceding
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 may throw
some light on the question of whether an administrative
body can best make judicial interpretations of Congressional
enactments. The Clayton Act of

191411

was the first effort

on the part of Congress to take recognition of the employeremployee relationship. Previously, in 189o, the Sherman
Antitrust Act r" had been passed by Congress to prevent un-

lawful monopolies, and the Clayton Act, which followed,
expressly stated that labor organizations were not unlawful monopolies. Dissatisfaction with court interpretations
began to develop on the part of labor leaders, it being
claimed that the courts did not interpret the Clayton Act
as favorably to unions as had been hoped and anticipated.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act 3 (Anti-Injunction Act), which
followed in 1932, recognized, expressly, freedom of association and self-organization, and the right of the employees
to designate representatives to negotiate terms and conditions of employment. The real significance is that it marked
the beginning of a policy on the part of the Federal Government to place its weight and prestige behind the employees' right of self-organization. The National Industrial
Recovery Act of 1033"4 was an effort to affirm this right by
requiring that every code of fair competition should contain
this and other rights of employees. By executive order, a
National Labor Board was established, consisting of an
equal number of employer and employee members, the function of this board being to settle disputes arising out of the
efforts of employees to organize and to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing. This Board
met with little success, as it attempted to mediate in labor
unrest, to hold elections, to certify bargaining represent11.
12.
13.
14.

38
26
47
48

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (1946).
209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1946).
70 (1932),29 U.S.C. § 101 etseq. (1946).
195 (1933).
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atives, and also to interpret judicially. The Board's obvious
weakness was its effort to fill the juJicial role and to enforce
its own orders.
The National Labor Board was replaced by what was
known as the National Labor Relations Board, established
by Congressional Joint Resolution; however, this board,
established in July, 1934, had little better success than its
predecessor, and its functions came to an abrupt end when
the Supreme Court held in May, 1935, that the National
Industrial Recovery Act was unconstitutional. 5
Following closely behind the declaration of unconstitutionality of the National Industrial Recovery Act, and in
July of the same year, the National Labor Relations Act 6
was passed. This act is commonly known as the Wagner
Act, and it is the immediate predecessor of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. The Wagner Act guaranteed to employees the right of self-organization, and collective bargaining through representatives of their own
choosing. It provided for the certification of representatives
of the employees, and prevented employers from engaging
in certain enumerated unfair labor practices. Those who
found comfort in the Supreme Court's holding that the National Industrial Recovery Act was unconstitutional expected that the Supreme Court would likewise strike down
the Wagner Act. In 1937, however, the Supreme Court
held that the Act was constitutional. 7 The Wagner Act became the center of a bitter controversy almost from its inception, and it was severely criticized as being contrary to
established concepts of American justice and jurisprudence
and to the right of every person to have his "day in court"
before an impartial tribunal. It was pointed out that the
Board made administrative rules under the Act, investigated
charges of unfair labor practices on the part of employers,
adjudicated the rights of the employer on bills of particulars
and finally, having investigated the accusations, preferred
15.
16.
17.

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570, 97 A.L.R. 947
49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
81 L. Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R. 1352 (1937).

States, 295 U.S. 495,
(1935).
(1946).
U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615,
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the charges, tried each controversy as a judicial tribunal,
and entered the order in the case.
The defenders of the Wagner Act took the position that
certain restrictions on employers were necessary in order
to equalize bargaining power, and frankly stated that it was
not expected that the scales of justice should be delicately
balanced when an issue was presented between employer
and employee. Between the enactment of the Wagner Act
in July, 1935, and the passage of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, the American scene changed in many
of its major aspects. The war years saw a series of strikes
in the coal industry and the defiance of the National War
Labor Board by John L. Lewis and the United Mine Workers of America. To meet this situation, Congress passed the
War Labor Disputes Act,1" which empowered the President
to take over any industry where a strike would affect the war
effort adversely. Membership in the two major labor organizations, the American Federation of Labor and the
Congress of Industrial Organizations, was increasing rapidly."9 Labor unrest became widespread and President Truman recommended that fact finding boards be established
in emergency cases. After study, Congress enacted what
was known as the Case Bill, 20 which, however, was vetoed
by the President and the House of Representatives failed
to override the veto. The Case Bill would have established
a five-man mediation board, would have held unions liable
for a breach of their contracts, would have outlawed
secondary boycotts, and would have set up compulsory arbitration as to disputes involving public utilities. While the
Case Bill never became law, it did indicate a stiffening attitude in the legislative mind. A bill of minor importance was
passed by Congress known as the Lea (Anti-Petrillo) Act,'
18.
19.

57 STAT. 163 (1943), 50 U.S.C. § 1501 (1946).

431 (2d ed.
1948). This author says that in 1947 the AFL had 7,505,446
PHILIP TAFT, ECONOMICS AND PROBLEMS OF LABOR

members, and the CIO claimed 6,000,000.

20. See, MALIN & UNTERBERGER, OPERATING UNDER THE TAFT-HARTLEY
ACT 47 (1947), for a discussion of the Case Bill and its effect,
21.

despite its failure to become a law, on subsequent laws.
60 STAT. 89 (1946), 47 U.S.C. § 506 (1946).
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which sought to stamp out what was known as "featherbedding," with particular reference to the radio industry,
this Act declaring it unlawful to compel a radio station by
force or threat to employ any person in excess of the number
of employees needed to perform actual services.
The Congressional elections of 1946 found the Republicans in control of both the House and the Senate, and
Representative Fred A. Hartley, Jr., and Senator Robert
A. Taft jointly sponsored the bill which, after some several
amendments, became known as the Labor Management Relations Act of i947. The President vetoed the bill and the
Congress promptly overrode the veto. The Taft-Hartley
law, in its declaration of policy, finds that industrial strife is
due not only to the activities of some employers but also to
the certain practices engaged in by labor unions. The TaftHartley law again affirms the right of employees to engage
in concerted activities, but pronounces that employees may
refuse to engage in such activities. The proponents of the
Taft-Hartley law claim for it that it will establish a power
balance between employers and unions, will protect employee rights and will safeguard the public interests.
The NLRB under the Taft-Hartley law, as under the
original Wagner Act, exercises the judicial function. Will
this prove to be a fatal defect under the Taft-Hartley Act?
III
An interesting illustration of what has happened in the
exercise of the judicial functions under the Taft-Hartley
law is shown in the handling of Section 9 (h) of the Act by
the NLRB. In substance, this section provides that neither
a petition for certification nor a complaint for unfair labor
practices may be filed by a labor organization until the officer
or officers of any "national or international labor organization" of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit have filed
an affidavit or affidavits with the Board, to the effect that
such officers are not members of the Communist party and
are not affiliated with said party, and that such officer or
officers do not believe in and are not members of and do not
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support any organization that believes in or teaches the
overthrow of the United States Government by force or by
22

any illegal or unconstitutional methods.
Until shortly prior to January I, i95o, Mr. Philip Mur-

ray, the President of the CIO, had refused to sign the required affidavit. It is not important just why he refused to
sign, although it is indicated that he desired to test the constitutionality of this part of the Act.23 During the time when
he refused to sign the affidavit, many petitions for certification and complaints of unfair labor practices were being
filed by local organizations of national and international
unions affiiliated with the CIO. In such cases thd point was
legally made that such petitions could not be processed by
the NLRB.
As might be expected, the Board called on its General
Counsel for an interpretation of Section 9 (h). After giving
the matter extended study, the General Counsel took the
position that before petitions for certification and before
complaints based on unfair labor practices could be processed by the Board in behalf of any union, such union, and
the national or international with which it was affiliated,
and the parent organization, had to comply with Section

(h). The NLRB disregarded the opinion of its General
Counsel on the matter and ruled in the case of Northern
9

Virginia Broadcasters, Inc." that parent organizations such

as the AFL and the CIO, are not national or international
labor organizations within the meaning of Section 9 (h)
22.

Sections 9(f) and 9(g) of the Taft-Hartley Act require financial
reports and descriptions of procedures and Union Constitutions,
and the NLRB takes the position that compliance with these re-

quirements is a matter of administrative handling for the Board.
It has been held that Congress may constitutionally attach these
conditions as reasonably incident to the public policy sought to be
promoted by granting the privilege. National Maritime Union v.
Herzog, 334 U.S. 854, 68 S. Ct. 1529, 92 L. Ed. 1776, affirming 78
F.Supp. 146 (D.C. Col. 1948).
23. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 960, 69 S. Ct. 887, 93 L. Ed. 839 (1949). The
Court said that Section 9(h) of the Act was constitutional and,
in addition to "other points, discussed the question of whether Section 9(h) constituted a bill of attainder.
24. 75 N.L.R.B. 11 (1947).
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and that the petitions of local unions might therefore be
processed even though the officers of the parent organizations had not complied. Presumably, the General Counsel
could have refused to issue complaints in cases where parent
organizations had not complied, but, instead, he has handled the cases on the theory that the Board should be allowed to define its own jurisdiction.25 The Board, in deciding the Northern Virginia Broadcasters case, held that the
officers of the AFL were not required to execute the affidavits in order for an affiliated union and its locals to use
the processes of the Board under the Taft-Hartley law, if
the officers of the affiliated international union and of the
local union had filed the required affidavits.
Labor Unions in the United States have developed along
certain well-defined lines. The two great parent organizations are the AFL and the C1O. 2 Local unions, representing
the rank and file of labor in particular industries and communities, are granted charters by what are known as national or international unions. 7 The national union is exactly like the international except as indicated by the name; the
international union grants charters to locals beyond the
territorial limits of the United States, for example, in
Canada and Mexico. The national and international unions
are in a measure autonomous; they are, however, federated
or affiliated with one of the two large parent organizations.
This affiliation is evidenced by a certificate of affiliation
from either the AFL or the CIO, as the case may be, with
each local and each national or international union having
attached to its name the symbol "AFL" or "CIO." The
AFL is the older of the two parent organizations, and was
organized to include skilled crafts originally. The CIO
was first a Committee of Industrial Organizations of the
AFL. It was organized to increase the membership in
unions, and proceeded along the line of industry-wide or25. For a full discussion of the relation of the General Counsel to
the Board, see The NLRB and Its General Counsel, 1 CCH LAB.
LAW JOURN. 83 (1949).
26. TAFT, op. cit. supra note 19 at 455, 461.
27. See, Brief History of the American Labor Movement, U.S. Dept.
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1947).
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ganization. The work of this Committee met with such success that it became independent of the AFL and became a
contemporary parent organization in a real sense. The AFL
is referred to as representing horizontal organization, and
the CIO is referred to as representing vertical organization
in industry. 8
The Board, in taking the position that only officers of
the local and the national or international unions would be
required to file the affidavits, did not consider that the parent
organizations were labor organizations within the meaning
of Section 9(h). It is to be noted that Section 9 (h) does
not say that each officer of a labor union must comply with
the affidavit requirement, but says that each officer of a
labor organization must comply with the filing requirment.
Section 2 (5) of the Taft-Hartley Act, defines labor organizations as follows: "The term 'labor organization'
means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in
part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment or con2' 9
ditions of work. "
In this definition, Congress must have intended to embrace a broader organization than a labor union, and did
apparently specifically and exactly include such parent organizations as the AFL and the CIO." The Board in the
Northern Virginia Broadcasters case took the position that

"national or international labor organization" were words
of art as developed in labor history and that Congress must

28. Ibid.
29. Courts have repeatedly held that because an organization may
have functions other than those relating to collective bargaining or
that these other functions may constitute the bulk of its activities, does not serve to remove the organization from the scope of
the statutory definition. NLRB v. Matthews & Co., 156 F.2d 706
(3rd Cir. 1946); NLRB v. American Furnace Co., 158 F.2d 376
(7th Cir. 1946).
30. See, Hearings before the House Committee on Education and
Labor, on Bills to Amend and Repeal the National Labor Relations Act, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. II, p. 555, Vol. III, p. 1337
et seq. (1947).
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have intended to use these words as understood by the labor
movement." But the difficulty of this reasoning on the part
of the Board is that Congress neither in Section 9 (h) providing for the filing requirement, nor in Section 2 (S), defining labor organizations, used the words "national or international union," to the contrary; the broader word organization was used throughout the Act.
The two parent organizations have many functions, including the organization of drives, political and legislative
programs, and community, health and educational programs. Certainly the two parent organizations exist "in
whole or in part" for the purposes specified in Section
2 (5) of the Act. The objects of the CIO, for example, are stated as follows : First, to bring about the effective organization of
the working men and women of America regardless of race,,
creed, color or nationality, and to unite them for common
action into labor unions for their mutual aid and protection;
second, to extend the benefits of collective bargaining and to
secure for the workers means to establish peaceful relations
with their employers, by forming labor unions capable of
dealing with modern aggregates of industry and finance;
third, to maintain determined adherence to obligations and
responsibilities under collective bargaining and wage agreements.
Strangely enough, the Board itself decided many times
prior to the Northern Firginia Broadcasters case, that the
CIO was a labor organization." The Board apparently
31. There is pending, as of the date of writing this manuscript (Feb.
1950), a case in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, NLRB v. Postex Cotton Mills, Inc., No. 12888. In this
case one of the two issues is whether the CIO (parent organization) as well as the Textile Workers Union of America, CIO
(local organization), would have to comply with See. 9 (h) of the
Act.
32. TAFT, op. cit. supra note 19 at 455, 456, 457, gives the functions
of AFL as follows: settling jurisdictional disputes; publicity and

information services; legislative action; education; organization;
chartering and controlling city central labor unions and state
federations of labor.
33. CONST. OF CIO, Art. 11 (1948).
34. Houston Press Company, 70 N.L.R.B. 660 (1946); Albermarle
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recognized that in some instances the CIO was directly connected with local industrial unions and industrial union
councils, and decided that in these situations where the CIO
was itself desiring to use the processes of the Board under
the Taft-Hartley law, it was a labor organization within
the meaning of the Act. 5 The Board's decision in the matter of American Optical Company 6 is an oddity when taken
in connection with its decision in the Northern Virginia
Broadcasters case, as it is difficult to see how the same organization could sometimes be a labor organization and
sometimes not.
The Supreme Court of the Unted States in the cases of
CIO v. Mc,4dory,3 7 and in the case of Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 8 both of which cases were
decided in 1945 prior to the Northern Virginia Broadcasters case, expressly held that the CIO was a national labor
organization. In passing on another part of the Taft-Hartley law pertaining to political contributions, the Supreme
Court of the United States in effect held that the CIO was a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 304 of the
Taft-Hartley law. 9
On the basis of the relationship between the parent organization and one of its affiliates, the facts appear to indicate clearly that a two-way interlocking control exists between what is called a national or international union and
what is called a parent organization, such as the CIO."
There can be no doubt but that Congress, in placing Section
9 (h) in the Taft-Hartley law, intended to rid labor organizations of Communist officers. 4 By requiring the filing of

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Paper Mfg. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 153 (1946); Volney Felt Mills, Inc.,
70 N.L.R.B. 908 (1946); Hanson Clutch & Machinery Co., 70
N.L.R.B. 1021 (1946).
American Fruit Growers, Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 1157 (1948) ; S. E.
Evans & Son, 75 NL.R.B. 811 (1948).
American Optical Company, 81 N.L.R.B. 453 (1949).
325 U.S. 472, 65 S. Ct. 1395, 89 L. Ed. 1741 (1945).
325 U.S. 450, 65 S. Ct. 1384, 89 L. Ed. 1725 (1945).
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 68 S. Ct. 1349, 92 L. Ed. 1849
(1948).
See CONST. OF CIO, Art. VII; CONST. OF AFL, Art. IV.
See Statement of Representative Madden, 93 Cong. Rec. 6542
(1947).
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the affidavit, any such Communist officers would be immediately placed in the spotlight, and every union, up and down
the line, would have to take steps to purge its own ranks and
those of its affiliates. The question is immediately raised as
to whether or not the national or international unions would
have the power to rid parent organizations of Communist
officers. The facts are well known as to the method of control in both the CIO and the AFL.42 The officers and the
executive council are elected at the annual convention of
these organizations by delegates of the national or international unions. In the AFL, more than 9o% of the voting
power lies with the union constituents and affiliates, and in
the case of the CIO the same situation exists as to the delegates from internationals and organizing committees. Thus
it can be seen that Congress, in inserting Section 9 (h) into
the Act, did not place a burden on unions which they are
not in a position to bear successfully. The parent organizations receive their income from the rank and file of the
union membership, with a per capita payment.43 Furthermore, recent conventions of the CIO have found it expedient to expel various unions from affiliation with the CIO."
The history of the two parent organizations are replete
with examples of stringent supervision and control of their
affiliates.
There would also appear to be but little doubt that Congress in enacting Section 9 (h) intended to purge labor organizations at the highest level, such as the AFL and the
42.

See THE CIO-WHAT IT Is

AND

WHAT IT DOES, published by the

Dept. of Research and Education of the CIO.
43. TAFT, op cit. supra note 19, at 459 says: "Revenue of the Federation is derived from a per capita tax upon all affiliated groups.
National and international unions paid in 1947 a per capita tax
of $ .03 per member per month. .

.

. In addition the AFL has

the authority to make assessments on affiliated unions at the rate
of $ .01 per member per week for a period not exceeding 26 weeks
in any one year, when the interests of the AFL require it and
when the available per capita income is insufficient."
44. In November, 1949, the United Electrical Workers were expelled
from the CIO because they were violators of CIO policy.
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CIO, from any Communist affiliations.45 The officers of
these organizations truly speak for labor and set the pattern in wage disputes and in other vital matters affecting
the rank and file of union members. The officers of the
parent organizations are in the best position to inflict the
harm which Congress believed to be a real danger to the
very existence of this country. It is of the greatest importance that the officers at the highest level be purged of
Communist affiiliations. During World War II, the AFL
Executive Council recommended to all AFL unions that a
"no-strike policy shall be applied in all war and defense industries." This recommendation was promptly adopted by
union officers, and there can be no question but that under
this wise leadership labor contributed a substantial part in
the winning of the war. Had the members of the executive
council not been loyal, and had the council failed promptly
to make this recommendation, the war effort could have
been seriously impaired.
Notwithstanding this clear evidence of the congressional
intent, the previous decisions by the Board itself, the decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States, and the
clear-cut, unequivocal language in the statute, the NLRB
made an interpretation of Section 9 (h) which ran absolutely contrary to what would appear to be infallible guides
in statutory construction." Not only did the Board decide
that the clause did not apply to the AFL and the CIO, but
it went one step further and held that it was a matter of
administrative determination as to whether or not any particular union had qualified under Section 9 (h)." In effect,
the Board was saying that it would not only place its con45.

In Congressional debates the possibility of disqualifying many
unions because of non-compliance of one officer was fully argued.
See Statements of Senator Morse, 93 Cong. Rec. 5290, 6612 (1947).
46. Roscoe Pound in his Annual Survey of Law, supra note 1 at 1095,
discusses the extent to which administrative interpretation may
go. He says: "This type of 'extensive' interpretation reminds one
of the saying of an English lawyer, speaking of interpretation
clauses, that the type was a provision that 'whenever the word
cows occurs in this Act it shall be construed to include horses,
mules, asses, sheep and goats'."
47. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 76 N.L.R.B. 922 (1948).
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struction on the meaning of the statute, but would also reserve the right to consider it an administrative matter and
that litigants could not even question whether a union had
complied with the filing requirements of the Act as this was
not a subject about which parties had a right to litigate."
Thus, in the case of Baldwin Locomotive Works," decided in 1948, the Board held that the determination of
whether a petitioning union has complied with the filing
and registration requirements, is an administrative function
of the Board not subject to litigation by the parties. In the
case of Lion Oil Company,' also decided in 1948, an employer contended in a Board proceeding that a union's petition should be dismissed because the record did not affirmatively show that the union had complied with the affidavit
requirements. Rejecting this contention, the Board held that
the matter of compliance was clearly one for the Board to
determine in any manner suited to the circumstances and
that the Board would not permit attacks on the validity of
affidavits in its own proceedings. The Department of Justice must prosecute allegations that affidavits have been
falsified, since the enforcement of the criminal code is the
function of that department." In view of this stand on the
part of the Board, if a petitioning union had not filed an
affidavit for one of its officers, and the Board through error
says that such an affidavit had been filed, the employer presumably would be absolutely barred from going into the subject and would be prohibited from making any showing of
non-compliance.
Extracts from the Northern Virginia Broadcasters case
show that the Board was not too happy in its decision. In
the opinion it was said:
"Our task is to determine the meaning of portions of Section
(h) of the Labor MIanagement Relations Act.
"... In this case both the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and its Local 1215, which is the Petitioner, have
9

...

48. Ibi.
49. Ibid.
50. Lion Oil Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 565 (1948).
51. Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. 842 (1948).
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complied fully with Section 9 (f), (g), and (h). As of today,
the parent labor organization, the American Federation of Labor, has not done so. The question therefore is whether, under
these circumstances, the Board has power to continue its inves'igation. The General Counsel, speaking through the regional director, has held that it does not.
"Candor, and a proper respect for the opinion of the General
Counsel, requires us to say that there can be no categorical answer to this question. Although it is possible to extract a few quotations from the Congressional Record and the Committee Reports to support either viewpoint, such quotations all prove, on
analysis, to be disappointingly peripheral in character.""
.. .The General Counsel in the performance of the duties
committed to him by this Act, has interpreted the terms 'any
ra::onal or international labor organization' literally to include
the AFL and the CIO. Such an interpretation cannot be said to
be without any legal support."

Mr. Gray, a member of the Board, dissented from the
majority opinion and said:
"In my view, the AFL clearly falls within the meaning of the
statutory language 'any national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit'. '"

IV.
The question presented in this article is not new and has
been considered by the Congress. The Ferguson-Smith Bill,
introduced in 1947, would have created eleven new labor
courts,55 one for each of the judicial circuits and one for the

District of Columbia. They would have had original jurisdiction of all cases arising out of collective bargaining agreements, and also the appellate jurisdiction specified in the
Wagner, Wage and Hour, and Railway Labor Acts. These

courts would have been composed of three judges-two
lawyers, and one non-lawyer "qualified by training, experience and ability to perform the duties of his office." The
52.
53.
54.
55.

Northern Virginia Broadcasters, Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 11 (1947).
Id. at 16.
Id. at 21.
S. No. 937, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced March 19, 1947.
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statutory provisions and rules applicable to the regular
federal courts would apply as to practice, procedure, witnesses, pleadings and evidence, with special provisions designed to simplify issues and provision for exceptional
promptness to meet the special needs of labor controversies.
Senator Ferguson, in introducing his bill,56 stated that the
existing situation was intolerable, in that both employers
and employees were uncontrollable in their disputes, and
the frequency of these conflicts interrupted the nation's economic life. He also stated that labor controversies are the
only ones still not subject to decision by the rule of law and
left to the outcome of the struggle between the parties. As
has been pointed out by leading writers,57 the situation referred to by Senator Ferguson impairs the authority of the
Government itself. No government can endure and command respect where employers or employees flout with impunity the statements of the President that their conflicts
are threatening the welfare of the nation and where they
refuse requests that they submit their differences to arbitration. A statement of President Woodrow Wilson is pertinent to this discussion:
"The business of government is to see that no other organization is as strong as itself; to see that no body or group of men,
ro matter what their private business is, may come into competition with the authority of society."

The Ferguson-Smith Bill did not become law. Perhaps
it was prematurely presented for enactment. Perhaps special labor courts are not the right answer. It may even be
conceded that the great body of labor relations law has not
been sufficiently developed to where the federal courts on
the district or trial level can best handle the situation. No
one, however, can doubt that the Ferguson-Smith Bill is
based on sound premises and is aimed in the right direction.
As Senator Ferguson said in connection with this bill:
"Today our economy is so intermeshed, and both unions and
industries have grown so big, that a single strike can paralyze
56. See Vickery, Labor Relations Law: The Ferguson-Smith Bill to
Create Labor Courts, 33 A.B.A.J. 548, 549 (1947).
57. Ibid.
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the nation. This situation has become intolerable. We cannot afford a national paralysis every few months simply because labor
and industrial managers cannot agree. The time has come to
settle these disputes on the basis of justice. The great principle
of equal justice under law should be broadened to include labor
management relations. We should subject industrial disputes
along with all other disputes to the legal discipline of a civilized
society and the machinery best suited to settle disputes and arrive
at just conclusions is the courts.""8

58. See Ferguson, Why Labor Courts, American Magazine, Feb., 1947;
Vickery, Labor Relations Law: The Ferguson-Smith Bill to Create Labor Courts, 33 A.B.A.J. 548 (1947).
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